Copyright: © 2026 by the authors. Licensee: Pirogov University.
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REVIEW

Ethics of early diagnosis of neurodegenerative diseases under ontological uncertainty

Abdullaeva DF
About authors

Pirogov Russian National Research Medical University (RNRMU)

Correspondence should be addressed: Diana F Abdullaeva
Ostrovityanova St., Bldg. 1, Moscow, 117997, Russia; ur.xednay@7avealludbaanaid

About paper

Financing: this research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (grant no. 26-18-00593), https://rscf.ru/project/26-18-00593/

Received: 2026-09-03 Accepted: 2026-09-20 Published online: 2026-11-16
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Alzheimer’s disease (AD) was initially described in 1906 and has evolved from a rare form of dementia into a global health crisis, affecting more than 58 million people worldwide in 2020 [1]. Parkinson’s disease (PD), in turn, is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder whose prevalence has doubled over the past 25 years, reaching more than 8.5 million people in 2019 [2]. Given population aging trends, modern forecasts indicate a further increase in these figures, making the problem of early diagnosis of neurodegenerative diseases one of the most pressing in the context of an “aging society.”

AD accounts for up to 70% of dementia cases worldwide, and according to forecasts, nearly 150 million people will be affected by 2050 [3]. At the same time, by 2050, up to 25.2 million people worldwide will be suffering from PD symptoms [4].

By 2026, clinical genetic and biomarker testing has become available to assess individual predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and Parkinson’s disease (PD). For instance, in March 2026, Roche received CE marking (Conformité Européenne — “European conformity”) for the world’s first Elecsys ApoE4 blood immunoassay, which detects carriage of the ApoE4 allele — a crucial genetic risk factor for AD. In July 2025, Roche received CE marking for Elecsys pTau181 — an indicator of amyloid brain pathology associated with AD. If combined, the biomarkers provide valuable information at all stages of diagnosis, helping doctors to diagnose the illness during its initial stages. This enables reliable and efficient screening out of non-carriers, reserving subsequent genetic testing for carriers only, to confirm their status and provide more detailed information [3]. The Genetic Testing Registry (GTR) lists clinical tests, such as the “Alzheimer’s Disease, Familial, Plus APOE Panel,” that are designed specifically for presymptomatic testing and risk assessment [5]. The database also holds clinical panels for PD [6, 7].

The diagnostic yield of genetic testing varies significantly depending on the disease and clinical context. Genetic mutation detection rates in Parkinson’s disease range from 5% to 28%: in familial cases it is about 10%, and in cases with disease onset before the age of 35 it reaches 28%. In the case of Alzheimer’s disease, the overall positive rate is significantly lower — about 1% — but it increases in familial forms and early-onset disease (before the age of 60) [8]. This means that mass presymptomatic testing of healthy individuals in the general population will detect very few genetically determined cases, while creating risks of anxiety and stigmatization for a large number of people with negative or inconclusive results.

Even a negative result does not exclude the disease risk due to alternative etiological pathways, whereas a positive result does not denote its development as mutations have various penetrance, and the disease is not manifested in a significant percentage of genetic carriers. The use of existing methods, thus, gives rise to a set of ethical issues. This places society before a fundamental bioethical question concerning the appropriateness of genetic testing without effective prevention: does an individual have the right to know about the risk if the disease cannot be prevented?

Not only does the testing raise the question of informing the patient, but also of what exactly we call a disease. This leads to ontological uncertainty, making one wonder where the boundary between the physiological aging of the brain and the beginning of the pathological process lies. Mild cognitive impairment occupies a borderline position and its diagnosis carries a risk of overdiagnosis as well as delaying intervention. Consequently, ethical dilemmas of early diagnosis cannot be separated from what we consider the “norm” in an era of demographic aging.

The goal of the paper is to identify and explore the ethical issues of early diagnosis of neurodegenerative diseases, namely Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease, which are exacerbated by the ontological uncertainty of the boundaries between the normal and the pathological, and to propose conceptual guidelines for their resolution.

THE DILEMMA OF PRESYMPTOMATIC KNOWLEDGE: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL RISKS

According to the classical principles of bioethics [9], a patient’s autonomy is a key value. However, in presymptomatic testing for neurodegenerative diseases, this autonomy faces new challenges, as prognostic uncertainty complicates the implementation of informed consent [10].

As noted by Grebenshchikova EG, the traditional understanding of patient autonomy is expressed through the concepts of relational and anticipatory autonomy. Voluntary informed consent serves as the key tool for the practical implementation of these concepts, designed to protect patient rights and interests when the prognosis is uncertain. This calls for a re-evaluation of the patient’s part in the decision-making process [11].

It is noteworthy that a theoretical dilemma finds empirical confirmation in clinical practice. Research involving 108 physicians across Germany identified a major discrepancy between the declared ethical principles and the specialists’ actual practice [12]. Thus, 81% of physicians recognized that patients have the right to remain unaware of their genetic risk. Despite that, 75% of the interviewed physicians always or almost always reported testing results to patients. This contradiction clearly highlights the tension between honoring a patient’s right to self-determination and the professional duty to provide full disclosure. Moreover, doctors reported a high level of stress (82%) and social stigmatization (70%) among the tested patients. In summary, it can be concluded that the data demonstrate significant psychosocial consequences of presymptomatic diagnosis, which are not always taken into consideration when making decisions regarding the testing.

A similar gap is observed among patients. Research from Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis shows that, while 81% of participants initially expressed a strong hypothetical interest in predictive testing of the risk for AD, only 60% actually chose to receive their results when the option was presented. The most frequent reasons for the refusal were as follows: fear that knowledge of the risk would become a psychological burden for them and their families; negative personal experience and perception of dementia in AD; satisfaction with their current memory status; a feeling of readiness for a possible illness; as well as the persistent uncertainty in predicting the risk of disease [13]. The gap between the declared and real choice highlights the tension between the right to information and the fear of the consequences.

A similar tension arises when a patient’s relatives are involved in the genetic testing process. Informing relatives about genetic risks is justified by the potential benefits this information offers them, particularly regarding conditions that can be prevented or treated [14]. Unlike diseases with effective preventive measures, such as hereditary cancers, the value of disclosing genetic risks for Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases to family members is less obvious. Nevertheless, even in the absence of radical prevention methods, knowledge of the risk can help in planning one’s life, family, and career, as well as in seeking early medical attention upon the appearance of the first symptoms. Thus, the issue of the patient’s right to withhold information from relatives remains ethically complex even in the absence of direct therapeutic options.

The ethical issue of confidentiality while treating neurodegenerative diseases is still pressing and insufficiently explored [15]. Genetic testing results are perceived by patients as highly sensitive personal information, which raises a complicated question for them: what part of the data, when, and to whom should be disclosed? Discussion of the results was often perceived as a taboo within the family, leading to situations where positive test results were hidden from family members, partly due to a strong fear of discrimination [16].

The risks of biomarker-based discrimination are especially high for people in the preclinical and prodromal stages of neurodegenerative diseases. These individuals can still work and are actively planning their financial and legal futures. Existing American legal frameworks, such as GINA (Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act), the ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act), and HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), predate the use of biomarkers for identifying preclinical phases of neurodegenerative diseases. This establishes a legal gap: GINA strictly prohibits discrimination regarding genetic information but excludes non-genetic biomarkers, whereas the ADA necessitates active symptoms before protection is granted. The use of biomarker data by third parties like employers, landlords, and insurers poses a genuine risk of discrimination. Moreover, the fear of such discrimination can become a barrier preventing people from getting tested, which contradicts the principle of autonomy and the right to information [17]. Psychological distress is associated with experiences of genetic discrimination. Meanwhile, people who learned about their risk at a young age or had a high level of education were more likely to experience discrimination. It is particularly noteworthy that discriminatory behavior originated not only from external institutions but also from immediate family members and social networks. Upon obtaining positive test results, some family members cut ties, blamed the individual for difficulties faced by other relatives, or offered unwanted advice regarding family planning and lifestyle [16].

In addition to direct discrimination, patients face stigmatization — the process of attaching the social label of “future patient with an incurable disease.” Research indicates that while anticipated stigma frequently outweighs experienced stigma, it is precisely this stigma that serves as the primary barrier to testing [18]. Stigmatization in neurodegenerative disorders exhibits distinct characteristics: in AD, it is linked to cognitive decline and the perceived “loss of self,” whereas in PD, it centers around visible motor deficits and stereotypes of helplessness. A comparative study of public attitudes toward Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and multiple sclerosis revealed that Alzheimer’s disease was uniquely associated with elevated levels of negative emotions, social rejection, and perceived stigma [19]. Therefore, discrimination and stigmatization represent far more than a theoretical risk; they constitute a tangible, multidimensional ethical obstacle that demands both legal and social solutions.

With regard to patient autonomy, the concept of the “right not to know” should be mentioned. According to Mattsson, Brax, and Zetterberg, predictive testing for AD creates a conflict between the principle of nonmaleficence and the principle of respect for patient autonomy. Arguments against early diagnosis are based on the absence of disease-modifying therapy and the potential harm a positive test result may entail, including stigmatization, feelings of hopelessness, despair, and an increased risk of suicide. Furthermore, the established diagnosis can result in legal implications, including limitations on holding a driver’s license or owning a weapon. At the same time, advocates of early diagnosis appeal to the patient’s right to informed future planning: even in the absence of effective treatment, knowing the diagnosis allows a person to draft a will, arrange advance directives, and express their wishes regarding future medical intervention while they still retain full legal capacity [20]. Thus, early diagnosis does not offer a straightforward ethical solution, requiring an individualized approach that takes into account both potential risks and the value of patient autonomy.

Empirical studies show that concerns regarding inevitable psychological harm from risk disclosure may be overstated. Kim et al explored the ethical aspects of blind versus transparent participant selection, applying standard criteria assessing the ethics of clinical trials (risk-benefit ratio, informed consent, fair subject selection, and scientific validity). They concluded that transparent disclosure does not constitute coercion and does not exert undue influence on participants; furthermore, data regarding psychosocial impact do not support the necessity of withholding information from them [21]. This means that in clinical practice, where scientific validity is not a requirement, withholding test results from a patient must be ethically justified not by the mere risk of psychological harm (hypothetical concerns), but only by clear and proven grounds related to the individual’s well-being. Examples include a severe psychiatric condition with a risk of suicide, an inability to comprehend the information due to cognitive impairment, a life crisis, or a real risk of serious discrimination in the absence of legal protection. In real medical practice, the principle of patient autonomy must be a priority.

The core dilemma of biomarker disclosure lies in the conflict between the potential utility of such knowledge for an individual and the potential harm caused by the absence of effective prevention and therapy methods. The ethical discussion surrounding the disclosure of this information faces a conflict between at least three normative principles: recognizing the participant’s right to the return of results, recognizing their right to access their own data, and demanding transparency upon enrollment in research. Given that the clinical validity of AD biomarkers remains limited, there are strong grounds for avoiding the proactive disclosure of such results to cognitively unimpaired individuals [22]. This conclusion echoes the issue of ontological uncertainty regarding the status of mild cognitive impairment (MCI): if we cannot accurately determine whether MCI marks the beginning of a pathological process or is simply a variant of normal aging, then the ethical evaluation of the consequences of disclosure becomes particularly complex.

ONTOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY: THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PHYSIOLOGICAL AGING AND PATHOLOGY

What exactly is being diagnosed? Where is the boundary between the physiological aging of the brain and the beginning of the pathological process? The issues are the most acute in case of mild cognitive impairment, which occupies a borderline position between the normal and dementia.

MCI is defined as a condition in which cognitive functions are reduced, while daily activity is preserved [23]. The uncertainty of MCI status creates serious ethical problems, since its diagnosis carries a risk of both overdiagnosis (labeling someone with a condition that might never affect them) and delayed intervention (missing early warning signs of pathology).

Biomarker-based diagnosis “expands” the disease category by including people who will never have clinical symptoms, which creates a risk of unwarranted medical intervention and psychological suffering. The diagnostic criteria of the Alzheimer’s Association, updated in 2024, define AD as a biological process initiated by pathophysiological changes in the brain prior to clinical symptoms. Based on these criteria, detecting abnormal biomarkers (such as beta-amyloid and phosphorylated tau protein) in a cognitively normal person may be considered sufficient grounds for making a biological diagnosis. According to the authors, this approach is intended to serve as a bridge between research and clinical practice [24]. However, as David Perlmutter emphasizes, such a shift turns a massive segment of the population into “patients” based on a laboratory indicator rather than clinical reality. Biological diagnosis overlooks clinical reality and blurs the line between a risk factor and the disease. This leads to overdiagnosis, unwarranted interventions, and psychological consequences for individuals who would never develop dementia [25].

Ontological uncertainty gives rise to another ethical dilemma: how should a doctor communicate a diagnosis when its prognostic significance remains probabilistic? Accorroni et al. show that different diagnostic criteria — strictly biological (the Alzheimer’s Association) and clinico-biological (the International Working Group on Alzheimer’s Disease) — form fundamentally different narratives in communication with the patient. The first approach reinforces a deterministic perception by equating biomarker positivity with disease, whereas the second allows discussing a state of risk. Choosing between these narratives is not a linguistic but an ethical choice, since it determines whether the patient perceives themselves as a “sick person” or as a “person with a risk factor” [26].

This diagnostic shift toward biological criteria has not only epistemological and communicative consequences. Furthermore, ontological uncertainty has direct therapeutic consequences. Rossini and Pappalettera question the appropriateness of administering anti-amyloid therapy to all patients with MCI and positive AD biomarkers, since more than 50% of such patients — even with amyloid and tau pathology — never progress to clinical dementia. Therefore, the universal use of costly and potentially dangerous anti-amyloid drugs in this group exposes patients to unwarranted risks of adverse effects and creates an unsustainable burden on healthcare systems [27]. This makes the uncertainty of MCI status not merely an academic problem, but a critical factor influencing the risk-benefit balance in clinical decision-making.

However, early diagnosis of AD raises not only these practical ethical questions about the benefits and harm of therapy, but also a profound philosophical problem related to personal identity itself. This challenges the idea of “psychological continuity” — the idea that our future “self” will be similar to our present “self.” AD destroys an individual’s identity by erasing memories and fundamentally changing their emotional and behavioral traits. This creates a unique ethical problem: when a person makes advance directives for the future, they make decisions for a person who may become completely different, and whose wishes may not coincide with their current preferences [20].

It is crucial to examine how human autonomy is practically applied in the case of MCI: if we do not know whether the person is ill, how can we assess their capacity to consent to testing or treatment? This issue is especially critical because empirical evidence shows that individuals with MCI often have significantly impaired capacity to provide informed consent. Significant deficits were found in crucial areas of decision-making, specifically in understanding information, evaluating personal consequences, and reasoning about treatment options. Compared to just 0.3% of the general population, the rate of incapacity to consent stands at roughly 20% among individuals with MCI and reaches 54% for those with dementia. In clinical assessments, clinicians frequently overestimate their patients’ ability to give informed consent. This situation presents a significant ethical dilemma: overestimation of capacity to consent may lead to neglecting duties of clinical care, while underestimation violates the individual’s right to self-determination. Consequently, with the expansion of AD diagnostics to the population of individuals with MCI and the emergence of new therapeutic options, a paradoxical situation arises: patients who are offered high-risk treatment may be objectively unable to assess all its risks and make an informed decision. This requires the development and implementation of supported decision-making models that allow patients with cognitive impairments to actively and meaningfully participate in treatment choices [28].

All of these ethical issues — from the uncertain status of individuals with MCI and the risks of overdiagnosis to the transformation of personality and impaired capacity to consent — are deeply interconnected with the concept of anticipatory autonomy, which was discussed earlier in relation to informed consent. In this context, the term refers to an individual’s ability, while cognitively intact, to make decisions about their future medical care, including the preparation of advance directives in case of incapacitation. Thus, the ontological uncertainty surrounding neurodegenerative diseases concerns not only the status of MCI but also the patient’s personality itself, which makes the ethical evaluation of the consequences of early diagnosis even more complex and multidimensional.

ETHICAL GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

An analysis of the ethical dilemmas of early diagnosis allows us to propose a set of measures aimed at minimizing risks and maximizing benefits for patients and society.

First and foremost, traditional informed consent fails to account for the ontological and prognostic uncertainty of results. Therefore, it appears possible to design and pilot a tailored consent protocol for presymptomatic testing. It should not merely inform of risks, but also make it clear that a positive biomarker test result does not guarantee the disease will develop, nor does a negative one rule it out. Integrating psychological preparation and assessing a patient’s readiness to receive their results will minimize psychological harm and strengthen trust in diagnostic technologies within an “aging society.” However, developing new informed consent is not sufficient in itself: a key condition for its effectiveness is not simply providing the document for signature, but also the need for a discussion with a doctor.

As shown earlier, stigmatization and stress do not end with receiving the test result. After this, the patient is left alone with the information, which can lead to anxiety, stigmatization, and social isolation. It is extremely important to provide the patient with systemic support and help transform the source of fear into a means of conscious life planning. A system of long-term psychosocial support can help address this; it includes psychological counseling, support groups for patients and their families, and educational programs aimed at reducing anxiety and self-stigma.

To prevent stigma from becoming an independent and serious barrier to testing, it is crucial to raise public awareness and challenge existing stereotypes. It is necessary to develop and implement information campaigns aimed at a broad audience to explain the nature of neurodegenerative diseases and dispel myths about them. Particular focus should be placed on groups with low health literacy, who may not understand why early diagnosis matters or the risks associated with refusing testing. It is important to emphasize that having biomarkers is a risk factor, not a death sentence, and that individuals with such diseases remain full members of society. Reducing the level of stigmatization will help create a more supportive social environment for people at risk of neurodegenerative diseases.

It is widely recognized that current legislation in several countries, including GINA in the USA, fails to offer protection against discrimination based on non-genetic biomarkers. Among the publications analyzing the legal framework in this field, the study by Arias et al. is particularly noteworthy. The authors propose an iterative approach designed to establish tailored legal protections for biomarker data. For example, they suggest enacting specialized legislation modeled after GINA, termed the Biomarker Information Non-Discrimination Act (BINA). The authors also recommend, as a temporary measure, not entering biomarker test results into patients’ medical records at the preclinical and prodromal stages to limit third-party access to this information. This helps maintain confidentiality until complete legal protection is ensured [17]. Based on this approach, we propose to develop and implement ethical and legal guidelines for medical institutions on managing biomarker testing data. Special privacy protection measures will allow patients to control access to their biomarker test results. This could involve the ability to restrict access to this part of the medical record for insurance providers, employers, and other requesting parties until relevant legislation is enacted.

The implementation of the proposed measures will turn early diagnosis from a source of ethical tension into a tool that fosters healthy and active aging.

CONCLUSION

Early diagnosis of neurodegenerative diseases represents not only a medical but also an ethical challenge. The technological availability of presymptomatic diagnostics conflicts with the ontological uncertainty of the boundaries between physiological aging and pathology. This conflict gives rise to a set of ethical dilemmas — from the question of whether testing is appropriate in the absence of effective prevention to the risks of overdiagnosis, discrimination, and infringement of autonomy in patients with cognitive impairment. The introduction of such diagnostics requires more than technological progress; it requires the creation of ethical, legal, and social infrastructures: improving informed consent, establishing a system of long-term psychosocial support, strengthening legal protection for biomarker information, and reducing stigma and discrimination. Otherwise, we risk getting a society where knowledge of risk does not strengthen autonomy and well-being but becomes a new source of social vulnerability and fear.

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